This work is grounded in the literature concerning horizontal inter-municipal cooperation. It considers the consequences of financial incentives to inter-municipal cooperation (IMC). In particular, the present work aims to understand whether temporary financial incentives to municipal cooperation lead to lasting outcomes. The outcomes are represented by the institutionalization of IMC once incentivized arrangements have elapsed. The empirical setting is represented by Friuli Venezia Giulia Autonomous Region in Italy. The program – mechanism under observation considers the incentives to municipal cooperation foreseen by the regional law n. 1/2006, which aimed to facilitate the establishment of inter-municipal associations (IMAs) for the shared delivery of functions and services, especially among small and disadvantaged municipalities. The main research question aims to understand whether temporary incentives to municipal coordination lead to lasting effects. With this research question we operate induction at aggregate level (IMAs) and at disaggregated level (municipalities). The paper analyses what are possible variables that induce the consolidation of IMAs. We introduce two sub-research questions (RQ2 and RQ3) about whether the attitude to remain in an IMA beyond the compulsory period is driven respectively by the size and the territorial features of a municipality. The conclusions of this quantitative analysis will provide some new insights about a possible path to the institutionalization of IMC of which IMA is an example. Indeed, it represents a preliminary explanation of variables related to the mechanism of incentives that could be extended to other similar settings.
Key-Words: Sistemi di pianificazione e programmazione, multilevel governance, financial incentives, inter-municipal cooperation, realist evaluation
