La disclosure sul sistema di controllo interno come meccanismo di monitoraggio: evidenze empiriche da differenti contesti istituzionali

Anteprima

I sistemi di controllo interno (SCI) orientano l’azione del management e contribuiscono alla protezione degli interessi degli investitori (e degli altri stakeholder).

La natura di meccanismi di governo interni all’organizzazione, tuttavia, impedisce la diretta osservazione dei SCI da parte degli investitori, i quali possono maturare un proprio giudizio sulla qualità della loro struttura e l’efficacia del loro funzionamento solo attraverso la diffusione di informazioni fornite dal management.

La teoria dell’agenzia offre un’utile prospettiva di indagine, suggerendo che il management avrà maggiori incentivi alla disclosure sui SCI quanto più deboli sono i meccanismi di governo aziendale. In particolare questo lavoro indaga in merito alla esistenza di un rapporto di sostituzione fra disclosure sui SCI ed altri meccanismi di monitoring riconducibili in essenza alla struttura proprietaria dell’impresa ed alla composizione dei massimi organi di governo aziendale.

L’ipotesi di sostituzione viene esaminata in differenti contesti istituzionali attraverso l’analisi della disclosure sui SCI di 160 società europee quotate su quattro differenti mercati finanziari (Londra, Parigi, Francoforte, Milano) per il triennio 2003-2005. Le evidenze raccolte e le analisi condotte testimoniano l’esistenza di tale rapporto di sostituzione, contribuendo a chiarire le logiche di utilizzo discrezionale della disclosure da parte del management.

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