I compensi agli amministratori: analisi della disclosure nei Bilanci delle società italiane quotate

Anteprima

Il presente contributo intende analizzare la disclosure relativa alla remunerazione percepita dagli amministratori, il cui ruolo di primo piano nel definire le sorti di un’azienda rende l’informativa ad essi correlata di particolare interesse per i diversi stakeholder. Obiettivo degli autori è quello di indagare nei documenti ufficiali (relativi all’esercizio 2009) delle 50 società italiane quotate maggiormente capitalizzate, al fine di verificare il livello di informativa obbligatoria e/o volontaria ivi fornita in merito ai compensi percepiti dai rispettivi amministratori. Le risultanze emerse saranno sintetizzate in un disclosure index di cui sarà valutata l’eventuale correlazione con alcuni parametri, selezionati in base a specifiche ipotesi di ricerca, inerenti alla struttura del board e alla dimensione aziendale.

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This paper analyses the disclosure on the directors’ remuneration, whose primary role in a company, makes their information of particular interest to different stakeholders. The authors’ aim is to investigate the official documents (for 2009) of the 50 most capitalized listed Italian companies, in order to verify the compulsory and/or voluntary disclosure provided about the remuneration paid to their directors. The findings will be summarized in a disclosure index whose correlation with some parameters (selected on the basis of specific research hypothesis) concerning board structure and company size will be assessed.

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Keywords: Disclosure, directors, remuneration, Financial Statement, Corporate Governance Report, listed Italian companies

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